Donna Waldrup v. Stephanie Eads – med mal OL/sanctions – Mary Lindsey died at the age of 64. Paralyzed from the waist down, she resided in a nursing home. In November of 2010, Lindsey was in pain and begged to go to a hospital but the nursing home refused. The next day she died. An autopsy showed her death was from sepsis due to a perforated colon. Lindsey died on November 7, 2010. Her family filed a wrongful death suit on December 7, 2012. The doctor the family sued had been served with an intent to sue letter on Oct. 7. 2012. A notice of intent to sue was sent to Eads on Dec. 12, 2012, and the complaint was amended to add Eads on that same day. Eads moved to dismiss based on the two year statute of limitations. Waldrup argued that the SOL did not begin to run until the date the autopsy report was signed – March 17, 2011. The trial court granted summary judgment for Eads and granted sanctions against the plaintiffs in the amount of $12,000, about 11% of Eads’ expenses in defending herself. The COA affirms the grant of summary judgment but reverses and renders on the sanctions.
Rosie Moore v. Jackson Cardiology Associates – med mal/SOL – Moore was being given a treadmill stress test when she fell and injured herself. Almost three years later she filed suit. The trial court dismissed the case based on the two year SOL for med mal cases. Moore argues that this was not med mal but garden variety negligence. The COA disagrees and affirms summary judgment for the clinic.
Duane John v. State – voluntariness of consent for blood alcohol test – John was convicted of six counts of DUI and negligently causing the death of another arising out of a December 2012 accident in Lafayette County. John’s vehicle flipped as he tried to pass another car. There were eight other people in the car; six of them died. While John was hospitalized after the accident, he signed a consent to have his blood drawn. It tested .18. On appeal he argues that the court should have suppressed the bac evidence. He claims the consent form at the hospital did not inform him that he had the right to refuse the test. The trial court conducted a hearing on the suppression motion and found John’s consent to be voluntary. The COA finds no abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling nor dies it agree with John that the evidence was insufficient.
Jimmy Gibbs v. Rita Moody – contract for lease-sale of house – Moody rented a home from Gibbs. The contract provided that she pay rent for four years and then could purchase the house by paying the remainder of what was owed. The contract was written by Gibbs and provided that (1) Gibbs rent the home to Moody for $500 a month and that Moody would obtain at least $33,000 in insurance. There was also an $8000 mortgage against the house to pay for foundation work. Gibbs agreed to pay this loan. When the four years was up, there was a $4000 balance remaining on the loan. A disagreement arose between the parties as to the responsibility of paying the remainder of this loan as well as the purchase price of the house. Moody filed suit and the parties agreed that the base purchase price of the home was the $33,000 mentioned in the contract’s second provision. Gibbs, though, contended that Moody was responsible for the $4000. The court disagreed with Gibbs. “The chancellor thus ordered Gibbs to pay the loan balance from the home’s sale proceeds.” The COA affirms.
Robert Joseph Galloway v. State – validity of confession – Galloway was convicted of possession with intent to sell less than 30 grams of marijuana within 1500 feet of a public park. On appeal he argues that the court should have suppressed his confession because he is illiterate and that the conviction was not supported by the evidence. The COA affirms.
Lauren Paige Woodard Mitchell v. Adam Stephenson Mitchell – custody – Adam and Paige were married in 2009. Their son Mann was born in August of 2011. In 2012, Paige filed for divorce. The parties ended up agreeing on the divorce. After a hearing. the court awarded custody of Mann to Adam and Paige appeals arguing that, as Mann’s mother, she is presumed to be the best parent. The COA finds that there is no such presumption and finds no reason to disturb the chancellor’s findings.
Tasha Davis v. Jones County School District – – tort claims act – Tasha’s daughter Callie was in the school parking lot after school was out but before her after-school drama class. “Callie, along with two other students, rode on the trunk of a car that was being driven by a third student to a nearby parking lot also located on campus.” On the trip back, Callie fell and struck her head and died. er mother filed suit against the school district alleging, among other things, that there were insufficient persons supervising. The trial court granted summary judgment to the school district. The COA affirms.
This Court has previously held that a school district’s oversight of a school parking lot as students were leaving school is discretionary, not ministerial. J.S., 94 So. 3d at 1251 (¶11). In addition, we recently rejected the argument that section 37-9-69 should be applied to a school district that allegedly failed to monitor its parking lot while students left after-school 5 activities. See Q.A. ex rel. D.W. v. Pearl Pub. Sch. Dist., 87 So. 3d 1073, 1078-79 (¶¶14-16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
Pearl River County v. Janice Bethea – tort claims act – The Betheas were injured when their vehicle was struck by a car driven by an on-duty Pearl River County Sheriff’s deputy whose vehicle was having braking issues. “The trial judge found that immunity did not attach to Pearl River County because English acted in reckless disregard for the safety of others by continuing to drive a vehicle that had been signaling that there were brake problems for several weeks and failing to properly resolve the brake issues.” The COA affirms.
Ronald McDonald v. State – The COA affirms the trial court’s dismissal of McDonald’s pro se pcr motion.